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Like the competition-related laws of most other nations, s 36 of New Zealand's Commerce Act 1986 
includes a prohibition of some unilateral acts by firms with substantial market power. Such 
prohibitions reflect the consensus view of many jurisdictions, courts and commentators that the 
anticompetitive potential of unilateral conduct largely depends on the market power of the firm 
undertaking it. In lieu of an inquiry into the actual or probable effects of challenged conduct, 
however, s 36 has been interpreted to rely on a "counterfactual" test, seemingly unique in the world. 
Under that approach, courts have been directed to ask whether a firm lacking substantial market 
power would have engaged in the same conduct, and from the answer to that question to infer the 
likely effects of the conduct by the firm with market power. This article argues that the 
counterfactual test will frequently be an unreliable method for implementing the language and 
underlying purposes of s 36.  In many common circumstances it will likely fail to proscribe conduct 
that may well be harmful to competition and consumers, and result in systematic under-deterrence. 
In other cases, it may fail to recognise and credit efficiencies that might be unique to the firm with 
market power, and hence over-deter procompetitive conduct.  The article concludes by considering 
several options for reform. 
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"Where a defendant maintains substantial market power, his activities are examined through a special 
lens: Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws—or that might even be 
viewed as procompetitive—can take on exclusionary connotations when practiced by a monopolist."1  
I INTRODUCTION 
Justice Antonin Scalia's dissenting opinion in Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services, 
Inc, quoted above, expresses a proposition that is widely accepted by economists and most 
competition enforcement regimes around the world: the anticompetitive potential of unilateral 
conduct largely depends on the market power of the firm undertaking it.2 It is also implicit in the 
competition statutes of every jurisdiction that has prohibited anticompetitive unilateral conduct. The 
examination of unilateral conduct, therefore, begins with an inquiry into the power of the firm. It 
then logically moves on to consider the nature and competitive effects of the conduct under 
examination. Whether evaluating past conduct or undertaking prospective analysis of current or 
proposed conduct, the paramount goal is to evaluate the conduct's actual or probable competitive 
effect.3 
  
1  Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services Inc 504 US 451 (1992) at 488 per Justice Scalia dissenting. 
In support of this proposition, Justice Scalia cited the then current edition of the authoritative Areeda and 
Turner treatise on antitrust law. The equivalent point is made in the current edition: "The definition of 
'exclusionary conduct' [in this treatise] … was predicated on the existence of substantial market power. 
Those definitions cannot be automatically carried over to firms without such power. A given act might be 
significantly anticompetitive only when the actor possesses substantial power." Phillip E Areeda and 
Herbert Hovenkamp Antitrust Law (3rd ed, Aspen Publishers, New York, 2008) vol 3B at 394. Similarly, 
the treatise authors note at 423 that "conduct that would have significant anticompetitive effects when 
coupled with substantial market power may well have negligible or no effect when power is slight or non-
existent. In that event, the conduct would not be harmful and would not contribute significantly to any 
market power that the actor might have or eventually obtain." See also United States v Dentsply 
International Inc 399 F 3d 181 (3rd Cir 2005) at 187: "Behavior that otherwise might comply with antitrust 
law may be impermissibly exclusionary when practiced by a monopolist." 
2  It was urged upon the New Zealand Supreme Court by the New Zealand Commerce Commission in 
Commerce Commission v Telecom Corp of New Zealand Ltd [2010] NZSC 111, [2011] 1 NZLR 577 
[0867]; noted in Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 13, (2001) 205 CLR 1; and 
cited by several commentators. See for example, Paul G Scott "Taking a Wrong Turn? The Supreme Court 
and Section 36 of the Commerce Act" (2011) 17 NZBLQ 260 at 264, 268 and 275; and Rex T Ahdar "The 
unfulfilled promise of New Zealand's monopolisation law: Sources, symptoms and solutions" (2009) 16 
CCLJ 291 at 294. New Zealand Commerce Commission Chairman, Dr Mark Berry, has made the same 
observation: "It is not difficult to identify instances where unilateral conduct may be of no concern, or even 
pro-competitive, when undertaken by a non-dominant firm in a competitive market, but may well be 
anticompetitive and cause consumer harm when engaged in by a dominant firm." Mark N Berry "New 
Zealand Antitrust: Some Reflections on the First Twenty-Five Years" (2013) 10 Loy U Chi Int'l L Rev 125 
at 145.  
3  Professor Steven C Salop has described this prioritisation of competitive effects as a "first principle" of 
modern competition law. See for example Steven C Salop "The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, 
Kodak, and Antitrust at the Millennium" (2000) 68 Antitrust LJ 187. As Salop explained at 188: "The first 
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This focused inquiry into effects, both pro and anticompetitive, is not limited to single-firm 
conduct. It is a unifying principle that influences how competition law authorities and courts 
approach the analysis of most collaborative agreements, distribution arrangements and mergers. And 
virtually all prohibitions of single-firm conduct, including New Zealand's s 36, have a threshold 
requirement that the single firm possess some degree of market power, whether it is characterised as 
a "monopolist", a "dominant firm", or a firm possessing "substantial market power". Similarly, 
many enforcement guidelines reflect it, creating "safe harbours" for conduct undertaken by firms 
that are unlikely to possess or obtain market power.4 The complete integration of these two 
propositions into the fabric of modern competition policy – that competitive harm is the central 
concern of competition laws and that such harm is unlikely absent a degree of market power—can 
be understood as one of the most concrete achievements of advocates of a more "economic" 
approach to competition analysis. 
Most jurisdictions have come to accept, therefore, that there are good reasons to more carefully 
scrutinise certain kinds of conduct when practised by a firm or a group of firms with market power. 
Although evidence that the practice is followed by firms who lack market power may suggest that 
there are legitimate business reasons for it, such as efficiencies, that evidence alone cannot substitute 
for an inquiry into the effects of the same conduct when practised by a dominant firm. To reach a 
judgment about the impact of the conduct on competition, it is necessary to evaluate it in a specific 
context giving due consideration to the particular characteristics of both that firm and the market – 
and this is true for both potentially anti and procompetitive effects. It is widely accepted, for 
example, that exclusive dealing or other kinds of distribution arrangements can be procompetitive or 
of little competitive consequence when practised by firms lacking market power. These 
procompetitive possibilities do not vanish when the same conduct is practised by a firm with market 
power and hence they will be relevant to any assessment of that firm's conduct. But the conduct's 
potential anticompetitive effects can be quite different and, as Justice Scalia recognised, might 
warrant examination through a "special lens" when practised by a firm with market power, precisely 
because of the firm's power.5 The mere possibility of efficiencies, as evidenced by a practice's 
  
principles approach centers on an examination of the competitive effects of the conduct at issue. This is 
appropriate because competitive effect is the true core of antitrust. Although market power and market 
definition have a role in antitrust analysis, their proper roles are as parts of and in reference to the primary 
evaluation of the alleged anticompetitive conduct and its likely market effects. They are not valued for their 
own sake, but rather for the roles they play in an evaluation of market effects." See also Andrew I Gavil 
"Moving beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice" (2012) 85 S Cal 
L Rev 733 at 748–751. 
4  See for example European Commission Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (February 2009) at 
[14] [EC Guidance on Abuse of Dominance]: "Dominance is not likely if the undertaking's market share is 
below 40% in the relevant market".  
5  This "special lens" shares a common foundation with the "special responsibility" sometimes cited in 
European competition law. See for example EC Guidance on Abuse of Dominance, above at 4, at [1]; and 
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adoption by non-dominant firms, should not obviate the necessity of an inquiry into its overall 
effects when practised by a dominant firm.  
Finally, although the experience of other, non-dominant firms is relevant, it is generally not the 
predominant focus of the inquiry in most jurisdictions. Diverting attention from the dominant firm's 
conduct and its effects, both anti and procompetitive, to the non-dominant firms in an industry, can 
become a distraction and a poor use of the limited resources of agencies, parties and courts. Like a 
magician's trick, focusing the investigation and litigation of a case of dominant firm conduct on the 
potential efficiencies realised by other, non-dominant firms draws attention away from the proper 
focus of the inquiry: the dominant firm and the effects of its conduct. 
These widely accepted principles of competition law and economics have been obscured by the 
New Zealand Supreme Court's adoption of the "counterfactual" test for judging whether a single 
firm's conduct violates the prohibitions of s 36. By focusing the analysis on whether a firm lacking 
substantial market power would have engaged in the same conduct, the counterfactual test 
substitutes a hypothetical inquiry into the conduct's possible efficiencies when practised by a non-
dominant firm for the more important question of its actual or probable effects, both pro and 
anticompetitive, when practised by a specific dominant firm in a market with observable 
characteristics. It trades an inquiry into actual or probable harms, efficiencies and motivations in a 
real world market for a hypothetical inquiry that reveals only whether some efficiency might justify 
the conduct by some other firm lacking market power. It does not pose the more relevant and 
illuminating efficiency-related question: whether the dominant firm's conduct had a significant 
anticompetitive effect, taking into account evidence of efficiencies, if any. Reliance on the 
counterfactual test, therefore, is very likely to produce "false negatives"; that is, it will fail to 
condemn conduct that warrants prohibition, precisely because it fails to attribute any significance to 
the dominant firm's market power. The test has also been criticised as being complex and difficult to 
apply, because the hypothetical market will be challenging to construct with any confidence. It will 
also be too dependent on hypothetical, as opposed to more relevant, real-world evidence and 
comparisons.6 
  
Robert O'Donoghue and A Jorge Padilla The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU (2nd ed, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2014) at 177. Both phrases serve to acknowledge that dominant firms may not be 
permitted to undertake the same conduct as non-dominant firms because the effects of that conduct may be 
different owing to their market power. The invocation of "responsibility", however, has had broader 
implications under European Union law and has arguably led to findings of infringement in a wider range of 
conduct, leading some commentators to observe that it can range beyond welfare-reducing conduct. See for 
example Pinar Akman The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and Economic Approaches (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2015) at 59–60 and 63. See also Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin EU Competition Law 
(5th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) at 374–375: "The principle that dominant firms have a 
'special responsibility' towards the competitive process … imposes what is in effect a positive, or 
affirmative, duty on the dominant undertaking to act in certain ways." 
6  See for example Ahdar, above n 2, at 298. 
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Nevertheless, the counterfactual test has been defended on a number of grounds. First, it has 
been argued that the test is essential as a means to rationalise the language of s 36, which might 
otherwise permit condemnation of normal, albeit aggressive competition, undertaken for the purpose 
of harming rivals absent harm to competition. It can be easy to mistake such conduct for 
"anticompetitive" conduct and some test is required to differentiate hard competition from 
"exclusionary" or "abusive" non-merits-based competition, because both can result in market 
"winners" and "losers". Secondly, it has been argued that the counterfactual test provides a bright 
line – some needed certainty and predictability to dominant firms, especially when they act in 
response to new competitive challenges. Such firms might otherwise be inhibited from pursuing 
aggressive strategies for fear of investigation and a finding of liability.7 And finally, proponents of 
the test have argued that it will preserve the incentives necessary to promote long-term, dynamic 
efficiencies.8  
More broadly, the counterfactual approach can be defended on a number of grounds typically 
associated with non-interventionist perspectives on competition law enforcement. The argument 
would go as follows: market solutions for competitive problems are preferable to government-
imposed ones; market power tends to be self-correcting because its exercise attracts entry and hence 
monopolies are not likely to be durable; enforcement agencies and especially courts are 
insufficiently schooled in complex economic analysis and hence their decisions will be prone to 
error given the complexity of market analysis; erroneous decisions will deter procompetitive 
conduct and may do so without correction for years to come; and the costs of administering complex 
rules outweigh the benefits of having standards that demand only relatively simple inquiries. Many 
of these arguments have been challenged9 and may be an especially poor fit for a relatively smaller, 
geographically isolated economy such as New Zealand's, where high levels of concentration already 
characterise many industries and entry is complicated by a variety of factors. They also do not 
appear to be a fair assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the counterfactual test. Ironically, 
like the test itself, these arguments in its favour tend to substitute abstract theory and assumptions 
for more measurable reality. 
In this article, I will argue that the counterfactual test is unlikely to provide an effective means to 
differentiate competitively harmful from beneficial conduct in many cases. To the contrary, it is 
very likely to lead to a significant incidence of erroneous conclusions, especially false negatives, 
  
7  Often overlooked is that "certainty and predictability" are not concerns solely of large, established, 
incumbent firms. New entrants (and their investors) intent on challenging incumbent firms also need a 
degree of certainty that they will be free to compete on the merits and not subjected to strategic conduct by 
the incumbent.  
8  See for example Matt Sumpter "Competition Law" [2012] NZ L Rev 113 at 126–130.  
9  See Jonathan B Baker "Taking the Error Out of 'Error Cost' Analysis: What's Wrong with Antitrust's Right" 
(2015) 80 Antitrust LJ 1. 
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and likely under-deterrence. It will tend to insulate incumbent firms with substantial market power 
in highly concentrated industries from competitive challenges, perpetuate the current, concentrated 
market structure that is prevalent in a number of industries in New Zealand, and diminish, not 
promote, the long-term dynamism of the economy. The counterfactual also will be susceptible to 
producing false positives. In practice, because it focuses on the incentives of non-dominant firms, it 
will systematically fail to recognise and credit efficiencies that are uniquely available to the 
dominant firm. Such efficiencies may escape notice under the counterfactual approach, and result in 
condemnation of conduct that may be procompetitive or competitively neutral because they are not 
accessible by the non-dominant firm. 
Finally, continued reliance on the counterfactual likely will have negative institutional 
consequences for the New Zealand Commerce Commission (NZCC) and the courts. First, it will 
impede the development of the law and economics of exclusion in New Zealand, causing it to fall 
behind developments in much of the rest of the world, perhaps for decades to come. The most 
advanced legal methods and economic techniques necessary to assess exclusion may not develop, or 
will develop more slowly, because they are not deemed relevant by the courts under the 
counterfactual. Even if the NZCC elects to follow globally recognised best practices in exercising its 
prosecutorial discretion, when it decides to initiate proceedings it will be forced by necessity to 
recast the case in anticipation of the court's application of the counterfactual. Doing so will 
necessarily drain its resources and likely give rise to an institutionally stressful discontinuity 
between the investigatory and adjudicative stages of its s 36 cases.  
Part II of this article examines the test itself. Internally, the test can be questioned for relying on 
debatable inferences and presumptions, and for not undertaking any true "comparison" with the 
most important and available benchmark – the actual market in which the challenged conduct 
occurred. Moreover, in all but the simplest of circumstances, it will not provide certainty and 
predictability. It can be costly to implement and uncertain in its outcome. Finally, the test seems 
more likely to undermine, not promote, dynamic efficiencies, because it will tend to insulate 
dominant firms from competitive challenges from new products, services and business models, 
reducing their incentive to innovate and emboldening them to undertake conduct that may impede 
new entry. It will, therefore, deter firms from challenging dominant firms and discourage investment 
in new entrants by the financial community. As noted, it will also tend to undervalue efficiencies 
uniquely available to the dominant firm. As a way to summarise and focus these various arguments, 
Part II concludes by applying a decision-theoretic approach to the evaluation of the counterfactual, 
concluding that it fairs poorly when judged for its tendency toward significant error and high costs 
of administration.  
Part III offers an alternative reading of s 36, one that considers it within the broader context of 
the Commerce Act 1986, rather than in isolation. Section 36 selectively borrows features from the 
Commerce Act's other provisions, yet as interpreted stands apart from them owing to reliance on its 
unique version of the counterfactual. The counterfactual thus has created an internally inconsistent 
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and dissonant overall competition law framework. In lieu of the counterfactual, an effects-focused 
interpretation of its "taking advantage of" language could better align and harmonise s 36 with the 
Act's other competition-focused provisions. Similar methodologies would be applied to evaluate 
similar harms and benefits across its many provisions. Such an approach could help to promote a 
more integrated overall framework guided by a focused and common set of foundation principles.  
Part IV turns to the international community and assesses the counterfactual test in the context 
of global norms for evaluating single-firm conduct. Although it appears that s 36 was supposed to 
follow Australia's lead, it has evolved to be less flexible. Whereas the New Zealand Supreme Court 
appears to have mandated exclusive reliance on the counterfactual to assess whether a firm has 
taken advantage of its market power, Australia's s 46 has been amended so that the counterfactual is 
explicitly but one approach to be considered.10 Australia also appears to be poised to undertake a 
broader evaluation and amendment of its entire competition law framework, although debate 
continues.11 
More broadly, and as is well understood in New Zealand, the counterfactual is an anomaly in the 
global competition policy community. It is unique and arguably inconsistent with global norms for 
evaluating single-firm conduct. In other jurisdictions, courts and enforcement agencies tend to focus 
on the effects of dominant firm conduct in both the assessment of market power and in judging 
"exclusionary" or "abusive" conduct. In using counterfactual analysis, other jurisdictions focus 
solely on the dominant firm and compare the performance of the relevant market with and without 
the dominant firm's challenged conduct. As far as I can tell, none rely on the behaviour of a 
hypothetical non-dominant firm as the basis for counterfactual analysis. To illustrate this point, Part 
  
10  Amended in 2010, Australia's equivalent of s 36 now includes an express direction that the counterfactual is 
to be used as only one of several possible approaches (Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 
46(6A)): 
(6A) In determining for the purposes of this section whether, by engaging in conduct, a 
corporation has taken advantage of its substantial degree of power in a market, the court 
may have regard to any or all of the following: 
(a) whether the conduct was materially facilitated by the corporation's substantial degree 
of power in the market; 
(b) whether the corporation engaged in the conduct in reliance on its substantial degree of 
power in the market; 
(c) whether it is likely that the corporation would have engaged in the conduct if it did not 
have a substantial degree of power in the market; 
(d) whether the conduct is otherwise related to the corporation's substantial degree of 
power in the market. 
This subsection does not limit the matters to which the court may have regard. 
11  See Competition Policy Review Final Report (Australian Government, March 2015). 
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IV will examine the experience of a sampling of other jurisdictions to demonstrate that conduct 
likely to be condemned elsewhere might well be permitted in New Zealand owing to s 36's unduly 
narrow current construction. It will highlight in particular some of the "abuse of dominance" 
guidelines issued by a number of jurisdictions and some well-known cases. 
The article concludes by briefly considering several approaches to revising or eliminating the 
counterfactual test. First, it will examine an alternative formulation of the counterfactual test; one 
that reverses its focus from the hypothetical firm without market power to the dominant firm 
allegedly exercising its market power. Instead of asking whether a hypothetical firm without market 
power might also have had reason to adopt the conduct, it would ask whether the dominant firm's 
market power provided it with exclusionary benefits from the challenged conduct that would not 
likely have accrued to a firm without market power. In other words, to determine whether the firm 
with substantial market power "took advantage of" that power to eliminate or limit competition, it 
will focus more appropriately on whether the actual firm with market power derived any greater 
benefit from the conduct than would a firm without such power. If it did, the conclusion that it was 
"taking advantage of" that power, in the sense of deriving exclusionary benefits attributable to its 
power, would seem justified, although further inquiry would be required to assess the harm to 
competition and the justifications, if any, for the conduct. Secondly, it will examine "minor 
amendments", a corrective approach that would retain most of the current language, but refocus it on 
purpose and effect and, as Australia has done, explicitly provide for greater flexibility. Finally, the 
article will briefly consider whether s 36 should be entirely abandoned in favour of a statutory 
model that might be more consonant with the prevailing "abuse of dominance" approaches of many 
other jurisdictions. 
II SECTION 36 AND THE COUNTERFACTUAL TEST 
As a starting point, it is useful to read s 36 as if "reading it for the first time", without regard to 
its current interpretation and the controversy surrounding the counterfactual. What are its principal 
textual elements, characteristics and apparent goals? Approaching s 36 in this fashion reveals why 
its "take advantage of" language has come to play such a critical role in differentiating between 
conduct that may harm competitors and that may harm competition, between merits-based 
superiority and non-merits-based exclusionary conduct. It also helps to frame the essential question 
for any prohibition of unilateral conduct: does the counterfactual interpretation of the "take 
advantage of" provision achieve these goals? 
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A Reading Section 36 "For the First Time" 
Section 36, as amended in 2001, states in relevant part:12 
A person that has a substantial degree of power in a market must not take advantage of that power for 
the purpose of— 
(a)  restricting the entry of a person into that or any other market; or 
(b)  preventing or deterring a person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or any other 
market; or 
(c)  eliminating a person from that or any other market. 
The explicit elements of the offence are immediately apparent. Section 36 only applies to a 
person with "substantial market power", which, as already noted, reflects an appreciation on the part 
of its drafters for the principle that conduct by firms with substantial market power warrants 
distinctive treatment. There is no reference to "agreements" or "contracts", so s 36 appears to be 
targeted at unilateral conduct by such firms. Its operative language, shared with s 29, associates it 
with exclusionary conduct – "restricting", "preventing" and "eliminating" are all terms associated 
with conduct that excludes, or otherwise impedes or disadvantages competitors. Despite this 
seeming concern for exclusion, however, the provision does not explicitly refer to "effects" and does 
not include an explicit efficiency defence. Instead, it focuses on purpose, and the purpose that seems 
to matter is the purpose to harm competitors – "a person" in the same "market" as the firm with 
market power. So without regard to s 36's "taking advantage" language, s 36 could be read to 
prohibit all conduct unilaterally undertaken by a firm with substantial market power for the purpose 
of harming a rival, regardless of the conduct's broader competitive effects, both harmful and 
beneficial. 
If the statute was limited to just these features, it could easily be read too broadly. An essential 
aim of the competitive process is to best one's rivals. All firms, whether or not they possess market 
power, strategise to "eliminate the competition". With no further filtering mechanism, s 36 could 
support challenges to every act of a firm with market power that could conceivably be characterised 
as undertaken "for the purpose of" eliminating rivals, including obviously desirable actions, such as 
introducing new and superior products or services that wrest customers from the firm's rivals. This 
is the common and core challenge of all prohibitions of unilateral conduct by dominant firms. 
Competition will always yield winners and losers. Competition policy, therefore, must differentiate 
between the reduction in competition that can come from the operation of the competitive process 
itself and reductions occasioned by "improper" means, between what United States Judge Learned 
Hand once famously described as "superior skill, foresight and industry"13 and what commentator 
  
12  Commerce Act 1986, s 36(2) (emphasis added). 
13  United States v Aluminum Co of America 148 F 2d 416 (2d Cir 1945) at 430: "A single producer may be the 
survivor out of a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry. 
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Robert Bork described as competition "on some basis other than efficiency".14 This is not because 
the dominant firm is "entitled" to respond to new competitive challenges – it is because it would be 
economically undesirable for the standards of liability to themselves inhibit or deaden its incentive 
to do so. There must therefore be some anticompetitive act and a consequent reduction of 
competition. 
The sole element in s 36 left to accomplish this critical goal is its "take advantage of" 
requirement. With that added into the mix, s 36 appears intended to prohibit a firm with substantial 
market power from exercising that power for the purpose of harming its rivals. There must be a 
causal nexus between the exercise of power and a prohibited purpose. Section 36B adds that "[t]he 
existence of any of the purposes specified in s 36 … may be inferred from the conduct of any 
relevant person or from any other relevant circumstances." This ties up the package and highlights 
the connection between power, conduct and purpose. Adverse effects are the obvious, implicit 
concern, but are not expressly required as an element. 
The seemingly sole means endorsed by the New Zealand Supreme Court to accomplish this 
important goal is the "counterfactual". Yet the language of s 36 does not compel it; indeed, by 
focusing almost exclusively on the "must not take advantage" language, the test seems to elevate the 
importance of a single statutory element over what appears to be the obvious and explicit core 
concern of the provision when read as a whole: conduct that is undertaken for exclusionary 
purposes. Although s 36 does not also refer in the alternative to "effects", as does s 27, "restricting", 
"preventing" and "eliminating" are effects-focused words that arguably invite at least some inquiry 
into effects, especially given the often close relationship between purpose and effects.15 Yet, in 
derogation of this text of s 36, the counterfactual does not directly examine whether the dominant 
  
In such cases a strong argument can be made that, although the result may expose the public to the evils of 
monopoly, the [Sherman] Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is its 
prime object to foster: finis opus coronat. The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must 
not be turned upon when he wins." See also Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v The Broken Hill Pty Ltd 
(1989) 167 CLR 177 (HCA) at [24]: "Competition by its very nature is deliberate and ruthless. Competitors 
jockey for sales, the more effective competitors injuring the less effective by taking sales away. Competitors 
almost always try to "injure" each other in this way. This competition has never been a tort … and these 
injuries are the inevitable consequence of the competition s 46 is designed to foster." 
14  Robert H Bork The Antitrust Paradox (Basic Books, New York, 1978) at 138, cited with approval in Aspen 
Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp 472 US 585 (1985) at 605. 
15  As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit observed in the Microsoft case, 
United States v Microsoft Corp 253 F 3d 34 (DC Cir 2001) at 59: "Evidence of the intent behind the conduct 
of a monopolist is relevant only to the extent it helps us understand the likely effect of the monopolist's 
conduct." In support of this proposition, the court cited Chicago Board of Trade v United States 246 US 231 
(1918) at 238: "… knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences". 
See also McWane Inc v Federal Trade Commission 783 F 3d 814 (11th Cir 2015) at 840: "… evidence of 
the 'clear anticompetitive intent' behind an exclusive dealing program 'supports the inference that it harmed 
competition'." 
 IMAGINING A COUNTERFACTUAL SECTION 36 1053 
 
 
firm has engaged in conduct having the specified, prohibited purposes. It operates based solely on 
inferences.  
Other interpretations are clearly available and could restore meaning to the overall language of 
the provision. For example, if read simply and literally, "taking advantage of" means benefiting 
from, as in "taking advantage of her superior strength and skill, she won a trophy at the tournament". 
It connotes conduct that provides a benefit to the firm, such as increasing its profits, which could not 
be realised by a firm lacking that "advantage". Read together with "restricting", "preventing" and 
"eliminating", it could be sensibly read to mean benefiting from the exercise of market power by 
engaging in conduct that harms rivals and helps to maintain or increase that power. The 
counterfactual seems to invert the language. Instead of focusing on the advantages flowing from the 
exercise of market power and how they were secured, it turns to an inquiry into the advantages of 
the conduct for a firm lacking it. The counterfactual thus seems ill-suited to play the role of 
differentiating "good" from "bad" conduct effectively. Even within the current language of s 36, 
alternative interpretations of "take advantage of" might better serve s 36's overall goals, while giving 
greater weight to its exclusionary conduct language. 
B Deconstructing the Counterfactual Test 
In its 0867 decision, the New Zealand Supreme Court defined the counterfactual test this way:16  
[I]t cannot be said that a person in a dominant market position "uses" that position for the purposes of s 
36 [if] he acts in a way which a person not in a dominant position but otherwise in the same 
circumstances would have acted. 
It later described the test as a "comparison", one intended to lend predictability to the business 
planning of firms with substantial market power by providing them with a bright line indication of 
which conduct will transgress the provisions of s 36: if a firm without market power would 
undertake the same conduct, then it cannot be said that the firm with market power "took advantage 
of" that power for a prohibited purpose. Hence, a firm with market power can adopt any course of 
conduct without fear of challenge if a hypothetical firm in a competitive market might have reason 
to adopt it as well. 
The counterfactual as so designed substitutes a hypothetical inquiry into the incentives of a firm 
without market power for an examination of the actual or probable effects of conduct undertaken by 
one that possesses it. It can be questioned on at least four grounds: (1) it does not involve any true 
"comparison"; (2) it relies on unsupported and unsupportable inferences; (3) it utilises incorrect 
  
16  0867, above n 2, at [13], quoting Telecom Corp of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd [1995] 1 
NZLR 385 (PC) [Clear] at 403. Clear was decided based on s 36's pre-2001 "use" language, and the events 
giving rise to 0867 occurred prior to 2001. But the Court in 0867 indicated that there was no difference in 
meaning between "use" and "take advantage of", at [1]: "… we conclude that the expressions 'use' and 'take 
advantage of' involve the same inquiry". 
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assumptions about the nature of "purpose"; and (4) it draws unreliable conclusions about causation. 
In operation, all of these flaws are interrelated and call into question the counterfactual's ability to 
serve its intended purpose of consistently differentiating unreasonably exclusionary conduct.  
1 Comparative analysis without benchmarking  
The counterfactual cannot fairly be characterised as a method of "comparative" analysis. 
Although it purports to compare the likely purposes of a firm without market power to the purposes 
of a firm with market power, in actuality it undertakes no such comparison. As will be explored in 
the next section, instead the counterfactual relies on inferences drawn from the predicted behaviour 
of a non-dominant firm. To accomplish its task, the test demands that the plaintiff construct a 
hypothetical, alternate market, in which the market power of the defendant is stripped out. Its 
aspiration of isolating that single characteristic of the firm and imagining a non-dominant firm that 
"otherwise [is in] the same circumstances", however, is unlikely to be realised. A firm's substantial 
market power will likely be related to other attributes of the firm and the characteristics of the 
market, which might include conditions of entry, the firm's cost structure (for example, its fixed and 
variable costs), and the size and characteristics of the other firms in the market. Moreover, to 
construct the counterfactual market, it will often be necessary to study the workings of the actual 
market, but somewhat oddly: the direct benefit of that study is lost as it serves primarily to assist in 
the construction of an alternate hypothetical market, one that the Court itself has acknowledged 
"will depart substantially from the realities of the actual market in which the firm is dominant".17 If 
it appears likely that the hypothetical firm in this highly altered and stylised market would undertake 
the same conduct, the counterfactual concludes that the firm with market power did not "take 
advantage of" its market power. In effect, the test reaches a determination that it took no greater 
"advantage" of its position than would a firm in a competitive market.  
At least in its theoretical form, no comparison is actually undertaken – the laboratory version of 
the counterfactual is entirely a one-sided affair that provides no basis for reliable comparison. It 
does not explicitly inquire into the actual firm's contemporaneous documents and records to observe 
whether there is reason to believe that it acted for a proper or improper purpose, but rather only to 
help in the construction of the counterfactual market.18 Neither does it explicitly inquire into the 
  
17  0867, above n 2, at [29]. 
18  Indeed, to satisfy the counterfactual's requirement that the hypothetical market must strip out all remnants of 
market power to ensure that the hypothetical competitive firm is "otherwise in the same circumstances" as 
the firm with market power, the parties and the court will necessarily need to devote considerable effort to 
understanding the actual market. Yet, having gathered such evidence, the court then substitutes an 
assessment of the probable conduct of the counterfactual firm for an assessment of the real one. By the point 
a court has gathered enough evidence about the actual market both to establish that the firm has substantial 
market power, s 36's initial element, and to control for and negate the characteristics of the market that may 
be linked to the defendant's possession of market power, however, it will likely have in hand the evidence 
needed to assess the probable or actual effect of the challenged conduct. 
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effects of the challenged conduct to determine whether it was harmful to competition. This reveals 
an important and essential characteristic of the counterfactual: it relies on implicit inferences and 
presumptions, not on any actual comparison of the hypothetical and real world markets, to reach its 
conclusions. From the observation that a hypothetical firm without market power in a hypothetical 
market might undertake the same conduct, it infers that the dominant firm did so without any 
improper purpose and concludes that there can be no violation of s 36.  
If courts were inclined to conduct a revealing and truly comparative analysis, they could turn to 
a number of recognised techniques used in other areas of antitrust that involve more reliable 
benchmarks. For example, "before and after" modelling compares the performance of a market 
before and after allegedly anticompetitive conduct took place to observe changes in output, price or 
other dimensions of competition. Differences are controlled for, not baked in to the model as with 
the counterfactual. Absent reliable evidence of the market's performance before the conduct was 
adopted, an alternate technique is to look for a real world "yardstick" market, one that is similar in 
critical ways, but in which market power is absent. Again, differences are controlled for, not baked 
in to the model. In consummated merger analysis, for example, one might compare the post-merger 
market with the pre-merger market, or seek to predict how the market would have evolved but for 
the merger.19  
If use of a counterfactual approach is perceived as necessary to any interpretation of s 36, a 
"reverse counterfactual" model also could be imagined, in which a court would compare the 
observed effects of the conduct with the likely effects of the same conduct if it had been undertaken 
by a firm without market power. Such a comparison of all effects would provide a basis for a more 
direct measure of whether the firm with market power "took advantage of" its power – did it derive 
some benefit that a firm without power could not have secured? If so, did that benefit flow from the 
conduct's pro or anticompetitive effects? Perhaps this kind of focus on the dominant firm is what the 
Court intended, but its description of how the counterfactual market is to be constructed necessarily 
leads to a different emphasis. Any of these alternative approaches would provide more of a true 
comparison than the current version of the counterfactual and would focus on the more salient issue: 
the dominant firm's purposes and the effects of its conduct. 
2 Drawing unreliable inferences 
Contrary to how it is often presented, the counterfactual thus does not involve any true 
"comparison". Instead it relies on questionable inferences and presumptions that warrant closer 
examination. The operation of the counterfactual, and its reliance on inference, can be observed in 
  
19  In contrast, in order to satisfy the "substantial lessening of competition" requirement of New Zealand's 
merger control provision, s 47, the analysis of a consummated merger would involve a comparison of the 
market as it actually performed post-merger with the market as it might have developed absent the merger. 
This, too, is sometimes referred to as a "counterfactual" test, but an actual comparison of the real market and 
the hypothetical one is undertaken. This does not appear to be the case under s 36. 
1056 (2015) 46 VUWLR 
several critical passages from the Supreme Court's 0867 decision. Citing the opinion of Heerey J in 
Boral, which arose in Australia,20 the Court endorsed the following as illustrating the "comparative 
inquiry":21 
If the impugned conduct has a business rationale, that is a factor pointing against any finding that 
conduct constitutes a taking advantage of market power. If a firm with no substantial degree of market 
power would engage in certain conduct as a matter of commercial judgment, it would ordinarily follow 
that a firm with market power which engages in the same conduct is not taking advantage of its power. 
Note the explicit reliance on inference in the second sentence: from the fact that a firm without 
market power would have reason to adopt the same conduct, the court reasons, "it would ordinarily 
follow" that a firm with market power that does the same is not taking advantage of its market 
power. At this critical juncture in the operation of the counterfactual, no true comparison takes 
place. Indeed, this inferential leap lies at the heart of the counterfactual – and its reliability is highly 
debatable.  
The essentiality of this reliance on inference becomes even more clear several paragraphs later 
in the 0867 decision, when the Court presents two corollary propositions:22  
The essential point is that if the dominant firm would, as a matter of commercial judgment, have acted 
in the same way in a hypothetically competitive market, it cannot logically be said that its dominance 
has given it the advantage that is implied in the concepts of using or taking advantage of dominance or a 
substantial degree of market power. Conversely, if the dominant firm would not have acted in the same 
way in a hypothetically competitive market, it can logically be said that its dominance did give it the 
necessary advantage. This is because it can then reasonably be concluded that it was its dominance or 
substantial degree of market power that caused, enabled or facilitated its acting as it did in the actual 
market. 
Both of these propositions are highly debatable and likely to be true only in specific and limited 
circumstances. The first wrongly infers that if a firm in a competitive market would have adopted 
the same practice, a firm with market power who adopts it cannot be said to be "taking advantage" 
of its market power. The proposition ignores the widely accepted fact discussed earlier: the 
consequences of the same conduct practised by a firm with market power will, especially when 
competition is at issue, be different when compared to a firm without it. As one commentator 
recently observed, it is a mistake to conclude from the fact that a business practice is "prevalent in 
  
20  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Boral Ltd [1999] FCA 1318, (1999) 166 ALR 410 at 
[158]. 
21  0867, above n 2, at [26] (emphasis added). The Court's use of "ordinarily follow" also invites inquiry into 
whether there might be exceptions and whether the inference can be rebutted. 
22  0867, above n 2, at [31] (emphasis added). 
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competitive markets" that a firm "cannot readily use these practices to harm competition, either at 
all or on balance after accounting for efficiencies" and hence to further conclude that they cannot 
violate competition laws. Such prevalence "does not preclude the possibility that firms can also use 
those practices to obtain or maintain market power, and that those practices harm competition on 
balance when employed by firms exercising market power".23 Almost by definition, the effects of 
the same conduct will be different depending on a firm's market power or prospect of obtaining or 
maintaining it. And because the effects of the conduct may well be different, the respective 
incentives of the firms with and without market power will also be different and hence should be 
examined before any conclusion can be inferred about their respective purposes and the effects of 
their conduct. While both firms may share the incentive to achieve efficiency, the dominant firm 
may also have distinct and unique incentives linked to the anticompetitive potential of the same 
conduct. Moreover, its ability to "take advantage" of its power to secure anticompetitive benefits 
may provide a more influential incentive for the dominant firm, one that will be irrelevant to the 
firm without market power. This kind of evaluation of incentives is very familiar to competition 
lawyers and economists, who typically focus intently on those incentives when evaluating other 
kinds of competitively sensitive conduct, such as collaborations and especially mergers.  The first 
inference in 0867, therefore, is very likely to be mistaken in many cases, precisely because the real 
world firm has market power. 
Likewise, the second, converse inference is also likely to be mistaken in many cases, albeit for 
different reasons. The absence of a reason for the firm without market power to undertake the 
conduct does not mean that it was necessarily undertaken by a firm with market power for an 
anticompetitive purpose. Recall that the counterfactual relies upon a theoretical construct – a market 
stripped of all of the characteristics of the "real world" market that might contribute to the firm's 
market power. Can it reliably be predicted that simply because conduct may lack any utility for a 
firm in such a hypothetical world that its only value for a firm with market power will be to achieve 
some anticompetitive purpose? Again the Court's answer disregards the unique circumstances of the 
firm with substantial market power. Although those circumstances may mean that it is uniquely 
suited to act for an anticompetitive purpose, as predicted by the counterfactual, they may also mean 
that it is better positioned to achieve efficiencies unavailable to the firm lacking market power, or at 
least that is in different "circumstances". There may be, for example, efficiencies available to the 
firm with market power, such as achieving scale economies, that are not available to the firm 
without it. There may also be various kinds of competitively beneficial arrangements that as a 
  
23  Baker, above n 9, at 17–18. Baker goes on to argue at 18: "Nor does the prevalence of certain practices, 
particularly exclusionary practices, in competitive markets support an inference that the same practices, 
when challenged by antitrust enforcers, typically have an efficiency motive, which antitrust enforcement 
would chill. Even if many or most instances of a practice benefit competition or are competitively neutral, 
that does not mean that the subset of instances challenged in court (by virtue of facts suggesting the 
possibility of competitive harm) typically benefit competition on balance, or even benefit competition at 
all." (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).  
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practical matter are available only to the dominant firm, not to a non-dominant firm, because of their 
desirability to third parties with whom the firm with market power contracts. For example, exclusive 
supply arrangements only possible because of the dominant firm's production capacity might 
increase predictability and reduce costs for a customer of the dominant firm. Hence, the 
counterfactual might wrongly conclude that a practice unlikely to be undertaken by a hypothetical 
firm that lacks market power is motivated by an improper purpose when practised by a dominant 
firm. It may be attractive to the dominant firm because it is beneficial to its suppliers or customers, 
who would be unlikely to realise those benefits if the same terms were offered to them by a non-
dominant firm. 
As was noted with respect to the counterfactual's purported reliance on comparison, if an 
approach based on inference is desirable, there are more reliable and informative inferences that 
could be used. As is acknowledged by s 36B, conduct and purpose are interrelated. Hence, "taking 
advantage" could be defined with reference to the actual conduct of a firm with substantial market 
power, and that in turn could provide a basis for inferring a prohibited purpose. To do so, New 
Zealand could turn to accepted definitions from other jurisdictions, especially the idea of 
"attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency".24 If a firm with substantial 
market power engages in non-merits based competitive strategies, it could fairly be inferred that it 
acted with a prohibited purpose. Such an approach would better harmonise s 36 with other features 
of New Zealand's Commerce Act 1986, especially s 36B, and would be more consistent with 
international norms. Again, as with an alternate form of counterfactual test, the goal would be to 
refocus attention much more directly on the dominant firm.  
3 Erroneous inference of permissible purpose 
As noted, in operation the counterfactual relies on inference: from the prediction that a 
hypothetical firm without market power would have adopted the conduct, it infers a non-prohibited 
(that is, non-exclusionary) purpose to the conduct, a purpose unrelated to "taking advantage of" 
market power. Whether s 36 requires a showing of "substantial" or "sole" purpose,25 this approach 
once again ignores the distinctiveness of the firm with market power and the potential differences 
between its incentives and the incentives of a counterfactual non-dominant firm. As already noted, 
although the dominant firm might share a beneficial purpose for adopting the conduct with the non-
  
24 For example Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, above n 14, quoting Bork, above n 14.  See 
also Phillip E Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp Antitrust Law (4th ed, Aspen Publishers, New York, 2015) 
vol 3 at 98 (proposing a general definition of monopolistic conduct). 
25  Section 2(5)(b) of the Commerce Act 1986 defines "purpose" as meaning "substantial purpose" (emphasis 
added). See also Mark Lyons Pty Ltd v Bursill Sportsgear Pty Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 581 (HCA) at [44]: "… it 
is sufficient that an applicant prove that one of the purposes actuating a respondent – provided only that this 
one purpose was substantial – was the deterrence or prevention of competition. It is not necessary to prove 
that this was the sole purpose." 
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dominant firm (perhaps it might even realise greater benefits), it might also and simultaneously have 
a substantial anticompetitive purpose; one that could derive from its ability to take advantage of its 
market power and thus be unavailable (and hence irrelevant) to the non-dominant firm. In other 
words, the substantial purpose of the non-dominant firm will not necessarily be a valid predictor of 
the substantial purpose of the dominant firm. 
The counterfactual will miss this possibility because it does not examine any real world 
evidence of purpose or effects. In essence, although a finding that the conduct is attractive to a 
competitive firm might suggest a procompetitive purpose, it does not eliminate the possibility that 
the dominant firm may have a distinct and even more valuable purpose in adopting the conduct, one 
that might well not be available to the hypothetical non-dominant firm. And that alternate purpose 
might be pro or anticompetitive. The counterfactual test will perform poorly as a basis for inferring 
substantial purpose, therefore, in circumstances where the dominant firm's purposes are likely to 
differ significantly from the non-dominant firm's purposes, and that could be the far more likely 
scenario in many cases involving firms with market power. 
4 Assuming causation where there may be none 
Recall that the goal of the counterfactual is to serve as a sorter, permitting courts, agencies and 
parties to differentiate exclusion occasioned by competition on the merits from exclusion occasioned 
by competition on some basis other than efficiency. It seeks to accomplish that by filling the 
"causation" gap in s 36: by determining whether there is a link between a firm's market power and 
its conduct. 
Given the internal limitations of the test, however, it seems unlikely to provide a consistently 
reliable basis for establishing or rejecting causation in many cases. It will wrongly conclude 
causation is lacking in a wide variety of cases of "mixed" or "multiple" purposes, where both a 
competitive firm and a firm with market power may share an interest in pursuing the same conduct. 
It may also wrongly conclude that there is no causation when a firm in a competitive position would 
not likely adopt a particular strategy, even though it might still be attractive to a firm with market 
power for reasons unrelated to its tendency to eliminate rivals. These weaknesses of the 
counterfactual as a test of causation become even more apparent when it is examined through the 
lens of decision theory. 
C Applying a Decision-Theoretic Approach to Assessing the 
Counterfactual 
Economics has influenced competition policy not only by informing the analytical tools we use 
to assess the competitive consequences of conduct, but by providing a methodology to specify rules 
of liability. "Decision theory" uses economic reasoning to aid in the selection of "optimal" legal 
rules, defined as rules that minimise total social costs. It seeks to accomplish that goal by evaluating 
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"error costs", the incidence and consequences of "false positives" and "false negatives",26 as well as 
the direct or administrative costs of the legal decision process that is associated with any specific 
rule. False positives – mistaken instances of liability – can be harmful because they will tend to 
deter both the defendant and others from undertaking similar conduct, even though it may not be 
harmful. Conversely, false negatives – mistaken instances of non-liability – can amplify incentives 
to undertake harmful conduct for both the defendant and others, harming competition and 
consumers. The costs of the decision making process are also relevant, and will include the costs of 
gathering and processing the information necessary to conduct the analysis mandated by any 
specific legal rule, as well as the direct decision costs. Bright line rules can fare well on the "cost" 
dimension, but if prone to error can lead to an increased incidence of erroneous decisions in either 
direction.27 
Error cost analysis has had a significant impact on the global dialogue about standards for 
judging single-firm conduct under competition laws.28 In the United States especially, the Supreme 
Court has been openly concerned about false positives and the unique costs associated with the 
features of the American litigation system – relatively broad discovery and class actions – and the 
United States' antitrust private right of action, which provides for the recovery by a prevailing 
private plaintiff of treble damages, attorneys' fees and the costs of suit.29 
The counterfactual fares poorly when evaluated under such a decision-theoretic approach. As 
has already been explained, it will be prone to false negatives, reaching likely frequent, incorrect 
conclusions that conduct is benign or beneficial when it may be harmful if practised by a firm with 
substantial market power. And it will do this systematically, precisely because it equates the 
incentives of firms without and with market power in lieu of any consideration of market power and 
  
26  Sometimes referred to as "false convictions" and "false acquittals". 
27  See generally Andrew I Gavil "Burden of Proof in U.S. Antitrust Law" in Issues in Competition Law and 
Policy (ABA Antitrust Section, Chicago, 2008) 125 at 129–131; and Andrew I Gavil, William E Kovacic 
and Jonathan B Baker Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy 
(2nd ed, West Academic Publishing, St Paul, 2008) at 77–80. 
28  See for example Steven C Salop "Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-
Sacrifice Standard" (2006) 73 Antitrust LJ 311; Frederick Beckner III and Steven C Salop "Decision Theory 
and Antitrust Rules" (1999) 67 Antitrust LJ 41; and Steven C Salop and R Craig Romaine "Preserving 
Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft" (1999) 7 Geo Mason L Rev 617 at 653–
655. 
29  See for example Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko 540 US 398 (2004) at 414: 
"The cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 liability."; Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp 475 US 574 (1986) at 594: Mistaken inferences and the resulting false 
condemnations "are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to 
protect". These features of the United States system are also described in Andrew I Gavil and Harry First 
The Microsoft Antitrust Cases: Competition Policy for the Twenty-First Century (MIT Press, Cambridge 
(MA), 2014) at 134–138. 
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how it influences actual purposes and effects. Indeed, it seeks to control for and eliminate 
consideration of those purposes and effects by constructing a counterfactual world that, by design, 
may not take sufficient account of the unique and possibly mixed incentives of the firm with market 
power.30 Also, as explained, the test could produce false positives (although these cases are less 
likely to be brought), because it fails to consider the possibility that there may be efficiencies 
available to a firm with market power that are not available to firms without power. Only the 
simplest of cases are likely to be decided correctly under the counterfactual – cases involving either 
naked exclusion or cases involving an obvious efficiency justification and a very low probability of 
harm. These kinds of cases, however, are perhaps unlikely to be brought or litigated because the 
outcome is so obvious, and they have not proven to be difficult for other jurisdictions to decide 
under effects-focused approaches.  The more complex, nuanced, and "mixed purpose" cases that 
may be more likely to lead to disagreement and litigation will be far more susceptible to error. 
It is also a myth that the counterfactual provides a bright line of predictability and hence a cost-
effective means of evaluating conduct. First, it does not avoid the threshold inquiry into substantial 
market power, which will still be undertaken in all cases under s 36. Also, as is evident in cases like 
0867 and Datatails,31 constructing the counterfactual can require extensive industry information 
gathering and fact-finding. The information-gathering process, however, will be prone to 
inefficiency given that the information is not relied upon for its highest value: to illuminate the 
actual purposes and effects of the firm with market power. The counterfactual thus can involve 
significant cost and uncertainty. 
Finally, the counterfactual is not likely to serve the purpose of preserving long-term, dynamic 
efficiency, an argument that has been offered in its defence.32 Similar arguments are often made in 
opposition to standards for judging unilateral conduct that are perceived as relatively more 
interventionist, but these arguments are prone to exaggeration and lack empirical support. First, and 
quite ironically, most competition law enforcement cases brought against dominant firms involve 
their responses to new entry, not innovative initiatives they have undertaken on their own. Although 
it is common in litigation for dominant firms to present themselves as "innovators", enforcement 
efforts have been prompted far more frequently by their strategic responses to innovators who have 
challenged their dominance.33 That does not necessarily mean that their response is anticompetitive, 
  
30  For similar arguments that the counterfactual will tend to be "under-inclusive and generate false negatives", 
see Cento Veljanovski "The Flawed Market Power Counterfactual" (2013) NZLJ 247 at 248. Veljanovski 
observes, as this article also argues, that the counterfactual wrongly dismisses the significance of the 
defendant's market power and the circumstances that give rise to it. 
31  Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Commerce Commission [2012] NZCA 278. 
32  See for example Sumpter, above n 8, at 127–130.  
33  For a discussion of this phenomenon in the Microsoft antitrust cases, see Gavil and First, above n 29, at 
327–328.  
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but it may suggest that, even if the response involves some true "innovation", it might not have 
occurred but for the competitive challenge. An important countervailing concern for competition 
policy, therefore, is the preservation of the incentives of firms who would challenge dominant firms. 
This will be especially true in a small-market economy such as New Zealand. As the Chairman of 
the Commerce Commission, Dr Berry, has observed, many of its industries are characterised by 
high degrees of concentration, significant barriers to entry and sub-optimal levels of production 
efficiency.34 Competitive challenges in such a setting are especially valuable and a standard for 
judging unilateral conduct that tends toward protecting the status quo may well have adverse long-
term consequences for the economy's dynamism. 
The argument also reflects a view that monopoly is more likely to spur innovation than 
competition. This is a reprise of a long-standing debate invoking the work of economists Joseph 
Schumpeter and Kenneth Arrow. As one thought-provoking survey concluded, however, the 
economic literature does not support an a priori assumption that monopoly will best promote 
innovation. "As a general rule, competition does not just lead firms to produce more and charge less; 
it encourages them to innovate, as well. Competition supplies a powerful motive for innovation."35 
Moreover, the more important question is whether thoughtful and targeted antitrust enforcement can 
promote innovation:36  
The modern economic understanding about the relationship between competition and innovation goes 
beyond Schumpeter and Arrow by suggesting ways for antitrust rules and enforcement efforts to target 
types of industries and types of conduct. Through such selection, antitrust intervention can 
systematically promote innovation competition and pre-innovation product market competition, which 
will encourage innovation, without markedly increasing post-innovation product market competition, 
and, thus, without detracting from the pro-innovation benefits. 
Case-by-case analysis of market conditions and incentives, therefore, is likely to provide a better 
methodology for assessing concerns about innovation than ex ante blanket presumptions. 
III LOCATING THE COUNTERFACTUAL IN THE OVERALL 
FRAMEWORK OF NEW ZEALAND'S COMMERCE ACT 
As it is currently being interpreted, s 36 is an admixture of unique characteristics and features 
drawn from other parts of the Commerce Act 1986. This Part examines its place within the broader 
framework of the Commerce Act and its interrelationship with other portions of the Act. It poses the 
broad questions: do the various provisions of the Commerce Act fit and work well together? Do 
  
34  Berry, above n 2, at 127–128. 
35  See Jonathan B Baker "Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation" (2007) 74 
Antitrust LJ 575 at 587 (footnotes omitted). 
36  At 589. 
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they work in harmony, the way the components of a well-functioning statutory scheme should, or is 
there dissonance? The discussion centres on ss 27, 29, 36 and 47. 
A Section 36's Relationship to the Other Provisions of the Act 
The counterfactual test creates an uncomfortable and unnecessary tension across ss 27, 29, 36 
and 47, undermining their collective cohesiveness. Section 27 prohibits an anticompetitive contract 
or agreement that has the "purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition in a market". It is New Zealand's general prohibition of anticompetitive concerted 
action and shares some key features with the similar prohibitions of s 1 of the Sherman Act in the 
United States and Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
which also target anticompetitive concerted action.37 Although s 29 similarly is addressed to 
concerted action, like s 3 of the Clayton Act in the United States, it is directed at exclusionary 
agreements, most particularly exclusionary refusals to deal directed at competitors. However, it 
more specifically structures the burden of proof than s 27. Whereas proof of a purpose or effect to 
substantially lessen competition can establish an offence under s 27, s 29 requires proof only of a 
purpose to prevent, limit or restrict competition. At that point the burden shifts from the plaintiff to 
the defendant. A defendant can rebut the presumption:38  
… if it is proved that the provision does not have the purpose, or does not have or is not likely to have 
the effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market.  
In cases resting upon evidence of effects, this language appears to reverse the burden that falls to 
the plaintiff in s 27: instead of effect being part of the prima facie case, absence of effect can be 
used as a statutory defence. 
Section 36 shares a common focus on exclusionary conduct and a requirement of an 
exclusionary "purpose" with s 29, but it is otherwise distinct in structure from both ss 29 and 27.39 It 
neither includes an adverse effect requirement nor an "absence of purpose or effect" defence like s 
29. So in contrast to both sections addressing agreements, it contains no explicit reference to effects. 
Also unique are its applicability to unilateral conduct, its explicit requirement of substantial market 
power, and its reliance on a "take advantage of" causation provision.  
  
37  Although s 1 uses the common law formulation of "restraint of trade", the United States' Clayton Act uses 
"substantial lessening of competition". In the United States "unreasonable restraints of trade" and 
"substantial lessening of competition" have largely been read as coextensive effects standards. Article 101 
prohibits agreements "which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the internal market". 
38  Section 29(1A). 
39  Section 29 may be repealed under pending amendments to the Commerce Act 1986. If the repeal becomes 
effective, s 36 will become the sole provision of the Act explicitly directed at exclusionary conduct. 
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B The Uncomfortable "Fit" of the Counterfactual  
How does s 36's counterfactual fit into this broader statutory scheme? In operation, it is not like 
anything found in the case law regarding ss 27 or 29.40 Conceptually, its threshold requirement of 
substantial market power might draw it closer to s 27, because market power is a likely requirement 
for proving substantial lessening of competition in many cases. But that will likely depend on how 
substantial lessening of competition is interpreted and proven, and whether market power is viewed 
as a matter of degree. Its focus on exclusion, on the other hand, draws it closer to s 29, but it lacks 
any comparable defence directed at purpose and effect. As interpreted to include the counterfactual 
test, s 36's closest analogue is perhaps prospective merger analysis under s 47. But s 47 does not 
include any "purpose" test; instead, like s 27, s 47 focuses solely on whether an acquisition "would 
have, or would be likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in a market".41 To 
the degree s 47 uses a counterfactual approach, in operation it is quite different from the process 
used under s 36, precisely because it is prospective and because it focuses solely on developing a 
true comparison of the market with and without the merger.42  
The end result is a system that seems unbalanced, internally inconsistent and unlikely to fully 
serve the overarching goal expressed in the Act: "to promote competition in markets for the long-
term benefit of consumers within New Zealand".43 One might take as a general rule of thumb that 
competition prohibitions should analyse like harms and like benefits under like approaches. Similar 
threats of anticompetitive effect, whether collusive or exclusionary, ought to be treated alike since 
they pose similar competitive threats. For example, guided by economic analysis, one might expect 
to see methodological similarity in the treatment of exclusionary boycotts, exclusionary distribution 
practices (such as exclusive dealing and tying), and vertical mergers that threaten to impair rival 
access to inputs or customers. This would provide for a common evolution of techniques and 
standards for assessing exclusionary conduct across all three provisions. But that is not the case 
under the Commerce Act. Each of these kinds of conduct, though sharing a common set of 
  
40  Section 27 could also involve prospective analysis where the Commission seeks an injunction to stop an 
agreement in its infancy. However, in contrast to s 47, s 27 likely would require an analysis of purpose.  
41  Section 47(1). 
42  For a discussion of the operation of the counterfactual under merger analysis in New Zealand, see Berry, 
above n 2, at 146–149. See also Commerce Commission Mergers and Acquisitions Guidelines (July 2013) 
at 18: "To assess whether a substantial lessening of competition is likely requires us to compare the likely 
state of competition if the merger proceeds (the scenario with the merger, often referred to as the factual); 
with the likely state of competition if it does not (the scenario without the merger, often referred to as the 
counterfactual); and determine whether competition would be substantially lessened comparing those 
scenarios." 
43  Commerce Act 1986, s 1A. The importance of this provision and its legislative history are noted in Berry, 
above n 2, at 129–130.  
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economic issues, will likely be analysed differently, leading to a lack of internal cohesiveness and 
consistency that undermines overall predictability and certainty.  
Section 36's reliance on the counterfactual serves to further isolate it within this overall 
framework. The end result is that s 36 stands alone methodologically, and seems poorly integrated 
with the Act's other competition-focused provisions, especially those that similarly address concerns 
with exclusion. 
IV THE COUNTERFACTUAL TEST IS AN ANOMALY IN THE 
GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY COMMUNITY 
A The Predominance of Effects-Based Analysis 
As noted at the outset of this article, the cornerstone principle that undergirds all prohibitions of 
single-firm conduct is that market power matters. Most jurisdictions, therefore, use some variation 
of an effects-based approach to the examination of single-firm conduct. They recognise that the 
competitive effects of a firm's conduct are likely to differ depending upon its market power. 
Although the relevant evidence of power, effects, conduct and purpose all tend to be interrelated, 
many formally begin the inquiry by assessing the market power of the firm, then turn to an 
examination of the conduct. This "power + conduct" formula, with some variations, is common 
across many jurisdictions and links the United States prohibition of monopolisation44 with the abuse 
of dominance model used in the European Union45 and many other jurisdictions.46 Typically, 
effects are proven based either on evidence of actual effects, when it is available, or reasonable 
inferences drawn from some combination of evidence of power, purpose and conduct.47 
  
44  In the United States "[i]t is settled law that … [monopolisation under s 2 of the Sherman Act] requires, in 
addition to the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, 'the willful acquisition or maintenance 
of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident'": Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, above n 29, at 
407, quoting United States v Grinnell Corp 384 US 563 (1966) at 570–571. 
45  Article 102(a) TFEU also prohibits "exploitative" abuses, specifically "directly or indirectly imposing unfair 
purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions," which would fall outside the prohibition of 
monopolisation in the United States. 
46  For a discussion, see Gavil, Kovacic and Baker, above n 27, at 582–587 and 718–722. 
47  As revealed through a survey conducted by the International Competition Network (ICN), some 
jurisdictions use a "formalistic, bright line" approach to assessing abuse of dominance, whereas others use 
an "effects-based" test. Albeit in different ways, both seek to evaluate the likely effects of conduct. Bright 
line approaches use presumptions to reach the conclusion that certain kinds of conduct, when undertaken by 
a dominant firm, are probabilistically likely to be anti or procompetitive based on certain market factors. 
The survey also observed, however, that "most jurisdictions apply a hybrid approach that combines a 
formalistic approach with varying degrees of analysis of effects, usually using rebuttable presumptions". See 
International Competition Network Unilateral Conduct Working Group "Unilateral Conduct Workbook 
Chapter 1: The Objectives and Principles of Unilateral Conduct Laws" (paper presented at the 11th Annual 
ICN Conference, Rio de Janeiro, April 2012) at [33]–[34]. The Workbook also observes at [43] that the 
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In making the initial inquiry into market power, most jurisdictions rely on the traditional process 
of defining a relevant market, calculating a market share, and inferring market power from a "high" 
market share, although the thresholds can vary. An evaluation of conditions of entry is also common 
and it is widely accepted that market share alone may not be a reliable indicator of market power. 
This approach to demonstrating market power can be understood in legal terms as using 
circumstantial evidence and inference to establish a presumption of market power. Increasingly, 
however, jurisdictions also look to more "direct" evidence to establish market power, such as 
indications that a firm actually exercised its power in its pricing or other market decisions, or by 
actually excluding rivals. Hence evidence of power and effects cannot be entirely differentiated – 
power is a precondition to effects, and evidence of effects can be integral to the initial inquiry into 
power and will tend to address both prongs of the typical standard, power and adverse effects.48  
Once the initial inquiry into power suggests that the firm is fairly characterised as a monopolist, 
dominant firm, or otherwise as possessing substantial market power, most jurisdictions move on to 
an inquiry into the conduct's probable or actual effects on competition – both pro and 
anticompetitive. Typically, this involves an examination of: (1) the conduct under evaluation; (2) 
whether it tended to impair, eliminate or possibly enhance competition;49 and (3) whether it 
increased or facilitated the continued exercise of, or insulated from erosion, the firm's market power. 
Circumstantial evidence and inferences can be used to support a finding of probable harm, but as 
noted below, those inferences are drawn from factors that directly relate to the dominant firm, the 
market in which it operates and its conduct. Although some jurisdictions formally claim that they 
will "balance" any pro and anticompetitive effects, true "balancing" is highly unusual in the sense of 
quantifying and comparing welfare losses and gains. Most cases instead are resolved based on an 
assessment of the strength of the evidence of probable or observed consumer harm. 
Although s 36 conforms to the first step to some degree – it begins with an assessment of market 
power – in its reliance on counterfactual analysis it deviates substantially from the global norm in its 
  
effects-based approach "allows for an analysis of the circumstances in the particular case, and is therefore 
particularly suitable where neither economic theory nor empirical research predicts ex-ante a procompetitive 
or exclusionary explanation for a certain type of conduct with a high degree of certainty". The Workbook 
summarises the results of responses to a 2007 ICN questionnaire, and reflects responses from 35 ICN 
members and 14 non-governmental advisors. 
48  This was the approach taken by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 
the Microsoft case. See United States v Microsoft Corp, above n 15 (finding that both the circumstantial 
evidence (market share) and the direct evidence (conduct) both supported the conclusion that Microsoft had 
substantial market power and was properly characterised as a "monopolist"). 
49  The "mechanism" of exclusion is critical to the inquiry. It will be essential to know, for example, whether 
the conduct raised rivals' costs or reduced rivals' revenues. Similarly, it will be important to know if the 
conduct lowered the dominant firm's costs, or otherwise improved its products, services or distribution. 
Understanding the direct impact of the conduct will inform the ultimate conclusion about whether and if so 
how it affected competition. 
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approach to the second step, the evaluation of the actual or probable anticompetitive effects of 
specific conduct. The counterfactual test as applied substitutes a hypothetical inquiry into the 
conduct's possible efficiencies if practised by a non-dominant firm for the more important question 
of its probable effects, good or bad, when practised by a particular, dominant firm in an actual 
market. Paradoxically, it strips out all of the evidence deemed most relevant to the effects inquiry in 
other jurisdictions: the dominant firm's market power, the key structural characteristics of the 
market and the firm's cost structure. Although evidence that could support an inference of probable 
anticompetitive effects, or of actual effects, is likely to surface during the inquiries necessary to 
establish market power and to construct the counterfactual market, it is neither the focus of the 
inquiry nor likely to prove dispositive.  
As discussed above, the counterfactual also trades an inquiry into the dominant firm's actual 
motivations and the conduct's probable effects for a hypothetical inquiry centred on inferences 
drawn from the probable behaviour of an imaginary non-dominant firm. Moreover, as has been 
widely recognised by commentators, it does not attempt to assess whether the actual or likely 
anticompetitive effects are more substantial than any realised efficiencies. It therefore functions as 
an "any efficiency by a non-dominant firm" standard, which, as already argued, turns on unreliable 
inferences: (1) if a non-dominant firm would adopt the conduct, by inference the conduct is deemed 
harmless, and by double-inference it is deemed harmless even when practised by the dominant firm; 
and (2) if a non-dominant firm would not adopt the practice, by inference it is deemed harmful, and 
by double-inference it is presumed that when practised by the dominant firm it must be "taking 
advantage" of its market power. 
Although New Zealand's competition law and the cases interpreting it look to the Australian 
competition laws and cases, the use of the counterfactual test appears to be more stringent and less 
flexible than the approaches adopted by the Australian courts.50 For example, the Australian High 
Court has discussed two additional tests, the "purpose test"51 and the "material facilitation test",52 
  
50  See Scott, above n 2, at 262–263, 274–276. 
51  Although the majority of the High Court of Australia did not adopt this test when they found the defendant 
had breached s 46, the market power and purpose test was discussed by Deane J in Queensland Wire 
Industries Pty Ltd v The Broken Hill Pty Ltd, above n 13, at 197–198. Deane J noted that the defendant's 
refusal to supply materials to a competitor other "than at an unrealistic price was for the purpose of 
preventing QWI from becoming a manufacturer or wholesaler of star pickets. That purpose could only be, 
and has only been achieved by such a refusal of supply by virtue of BHP's substantial market power … In 
refusing supply in order to achieve that purpose, BHP has clearly taken advantage of that substantial power 
in that market." 
52  The material facilitation test was discussed by the High Court of Australia in Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v 
Robert Hicks Pty Ltd, above n 2, at 51, noting that "it may be proper to conclude that a firm is taking 
advantage of market power where it does something that is materially facilitated by the existence of the 
power. To that extent, one may accept the submission made on behalf of the ACCC … that s 46 would be 
contravened if the market power which a corporation had made it easier for the corporation to act for the 
proscribed purpose than otherwise would be the case."  
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which were codified in an update to the Australian statute.53 Yet in 0867, the New Zealand Supreme 
Court sought to rationalise sole reliance on the counterfactual by arguing that these alternate tests 
are in fact mere variations of it.54 
Although a comprehensive canvassing of the world's competition laws is beyond the scope of 
this article, those laws are reflected in the policy statements and guidelines adopted by a variety of 
enforcement agencies around the world, including the European Commission (EC), the Canadian 
Competition Bureau (CCB), and the United Kingdom's Competition and Markets Authority 
(CMA),55 each if which has issued formal guidance documents in connection with their prohibitions 
of unilateral conduct by dominant firms.56 None appear to use an analytical approach like the 
counterfactual as it is applied in New Zealand. To the contrary, in their guidance documents, it is 
clear that all three jurisdictions focus on an examination of the market in which the dominant firm 
operates, and the actual or likely effects of its conduct in that market. This is not surprising given 
the interdependence of power, conduct and effects. And although these other jurisdictions rely on 
inferences, those inferences are drawn from the power and conduct of the dominant firm and the 
characteristics of the market in which it operates, not a hypothetical non-dominant firm. Indeed, as 
has been argued throughout this article, it is precisely because the effect of a firm's conduct on 
competition is a function of its power that jurisdictions include prohibitions of single-firm conduct. 
It is anomalous, therefore, to have such a prohibition and then to interpret it in such a way as to 
eschew consideration of effects based on the most probative evidence. 
For example, the EC's 2009 Guidance begins with an assessment of market power. If it is 
present, the inquiry turns to an evaluation of competitive effects, defined as "anti-competitive 
foreclosure".57 Among the relevant factors considered are the position of the dominant undertaking, 
  
53  These alternate tests have been discussed in detail elsewhere and repeating that examination is beyond the 
scope of this article. See for example, Berry, above n 2, at 141–142; and Scott, above n 2, at 262–263. 
54  See 0867, above n 2, at [30]. 
55  The current guidelines were adopted by the United Kingdom's previous enforcement arm, the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT), which was combined with the previous Competition Commission and superseded by the 
CMA in 2014. The Board of the CMA has specifically adopted the OFT guidance on abuse of dominance. 
See Office of Fair Trading Abuse of a dominant position: Understanding competition law (OFT402, 
December 2004).  
56  See for example EC Guidance on Abuse of Dominance, above at 4, at [2]. The document's purpose is "to 
provide greater clarity and predictability as regards the general framework of analysis which the 
Commission employs in determining whether it should pursue cases concerning various forms of 
exclusionary conduct and to help [dominant] undertakings better assess whether certain behaviour is likely 
to result in intervention by the Commission under Article 82." Due to subsequent revisions to the Treaty, all 
references to art 82 are now applicable to art 102 TFEU. 
57  At [19]–[22]. For further analysis of anticompetitive foreclosure, see Steve C Salop, Sharis A Pozen and 
John R Seward "The Appropriate Legal Standard and Sufficient Economic Evidence for Exclusive Dealing 
Under Section 2: The FTC's McWane Case" (Georgetown Law Faculty, Paper 1365, 2014). 
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the conditions in the relevant market, the position of the dominant firm's competitors, the position of 
customers and suppliers, the extent of the allegedly abusive conduct, possible evidence of actual 
foreclosure and direct evidence of any exclusionary strategy.58 In assessing these factors, as well as 
other relevant evidence specific to the conduct, the EC uses what it describes as a "counterfactual" 
approach. In contrast to s 36's version of a counterfactual, however, the EC's approach rightly 
focuses on the actual or likely impact of the conduct in the relevant market, not inferences based on 
a hypothetical firm in a competitive market:59  
This assessment will usually be made by comparing the actual or likely future situation in the relevant 
market (with the dominant undertaking's conduct in place) with an appropriate counterfactual, such as 
the simple absence of the conduct in question or with another realistic alternative scenario, having 
regard to established business practices. 
The Guidance further notes that:60  
There may be circumstances where it is not necessary for the Commission to carry out a detailed 
assessment before concluding that the conduct in question is likely to result in consumer harm.  
It explains:61  
If it appears that the conduct can only raise obstacles to competition and that it creates no efficiencies, 
its anticompetitive effect may be inferred. This could be the case, for instance, if the dominant 
undertaking prevents its customers from testing the products of competitors or provides financial 
incentives to its customers on condition that they do not test such products, or pays a distributor or a 
customer to delay the introduction of a competitor's product.  
The Guidance, therefore, focuses on an assessment of effects, both anti and procompetitive, 
evaluated based on the actual market circumstances. It also endorses use of a counterfactual and 
appropriate reliance on circumstantial evidence and inferences in establishing harm. But these 
inferences are to be drawn from evidence that relates directly to the dominant firm and the market in 
which it operates. 
The EC Guidance's treatment of efficiencies is especially telling when compared to s 36's 
counterfactual approach. It requires direct evidence and does not contemplate drawing inferences 
from the likely behaviour of a hypothetical, non-dominant undertaking.62 If a dominant undertaking 
has engaged in conduct likely to have anticompetitive effects, it bears the burden of "demonstrating" 
  
58  EC Guidance on Abuse of Dominance, above at 4, at [20]. 
59  At [21]. 
60  At [22]. 
61  At [22]. 
62  At [28]–[31]. 
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with "a sufficient degree of probability, and on the bases of verifiable evidence" that those 
efficiencies "have been, or are likely to be, realized as a result of the conduct".63 This focus on the 
causal link between the dominant firm's conduct and efficiencies starkly differentiates the EC's 
approach from the hypothetical approach associated with New Zealand's counterfactual. As already 
argued, rather than inferring that the dominant firm's conduct will yield efficiencies based on the 
predicted behaviour of a hypothetical non-dominant firm, the EC's Guidance asks the more salient 
question: did the dominant firm's conduct actually yield any efficiencies? 
It is noteworthy that the EC's focus is on actual or likely anti and procompetitive effects, 
assessed based on the characteristics of the market and the dominant undertaking's power and 
conduct. It does not ask the less relevant question of whether a different firm lacking market power 
might undertake the same conduct and then seek to extrapolate from the answer to that hypothetical 
question. Such an inquiry could hardly be as informative as an evaluation of the dominant 
undertaking's actual conduct and likely or actual effects in an observable, as opposed to 
hypothetical, market. 
Enforcement guidelines issued in 2012 by the CCB similarly focus on an analysis of the likely 
competitive impact of a dominant firm's conduct. Section 79(1) of Canada's Competition Act 
defines abuse of dominance as any anticompetitive act or practice that "has had, is having or is 
likely to have the effect of preventing or lessening competition substantially in a market".64 
Reflecting this statutory directive that the offence be linked to adverse competitive effects, the 
CCB's 2012 Enforcement Guidelines on the abuse of dominance begin by emphasising that s 79(1) 
is concerned with conduct that "creates, preserves, or enhances market power".65 The Guidelines 
explain that "[i]n carrying out this assessment, the Bureau's general approach is to ask whether, but 
for the practice in question, there would likely be substantially greater competition in the market in 
the past, present, or future."66 As is true for the EC, this "but for" approach focuses the inquiry on 
the effect of the conduct. To the extent there is any use of a "counterfactual", it is one rooted in the 
observed market. It compares the actual market with a market with the same firm and the same 
market conditions, but not the same conduct. The variable that is adjusted in the counterfactual, 
therefore, is the conduct, not the firm, which is held constant. In this way, the effect of the conduct 
is the focus of the inquiry. This starkly contrasts with the counterfactual as used in New Zealand, 
which holds the conduct constant, but treats the firm's power as a variable. 
  
63  At [30] (emphasis added). 
64  Competition Act RSC 1985 c C-34, s 79(1). See also Competition Bureau of Canada Enforcement 
Guidelines: The Abuse of Dominance Provisions (2012) at 1. For a discussion of the Act's abuse of 
dominance provisions that precedes the Guidelines, see Paul Crampton "'Abuse' of 'Dominance' in Canada: 
Building on the International Experience" (2006) 73 Antitrust LJ 803. 
65  Competition Bureau of Canada, above n 64, at 13. 
66  At 12. 
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Similarly, the United Kingdom CMA's guidance on abuse of dominance states that the agency 
"would find an undertaking's behaviour an abuse only after detailed examination of the market 
concerned and the effects of the undertaking's conduct".67 In "assessing whether an undertaking is 
dominant", the first step in the analysis, the Guidelines focus on an assessment of the firm's market 
power. The discussion makes clear that the inquiry remains focused on the characteristics of the 
allegedly dominant firm and the market in which it operates.68 The Guidelines indicate that "the 
likely effect of a dominant undertaking's conduct on customers and on the process of competition is 
more important to the determination of an abuse than the specific form of the conduct in question".69 
As in the EC and Canada, the relevant inquiry thus is concerned with the effects of the dominant 
firm's conduct, not inferences drawn from hypothetical, alternative firms or markets. And again, to 
the degree inferences are to be drawn from reliance on a counterfactual, the firm is held constant; 
the conduct is the variable. 
B Testing the Counterfactual with Case Law from Other Jurisdictions70 
This section briefly examines several examples of conduct that have been the focus of litigation 
under the single-firm conduct prohibitions of various jurisdictions. The selected cases resulted in 
findings of liability, but the results might have been different had the conduct been judged under 
New Zealand's version of the counterfactual test. That should not come as a surprise. Much of the 
conduct considered shares a characteristic often found in close-call unilateral conduct cases: despite 
evidence of harm, a plausible argument could be made that at least under some circumstances the 
conduct could yield efficiencies. The counterfactual will perform especially poorly in such cases; 
that is, the error rate will be high when it is invoked to judge conduct that can be exclusionary under 
some circumstances, but can also yield efficiencies. This is so because it will tend to exonerate 
conduct based solely on the probability that the practice would be undertaken by a non-dominant 
firm, without taking into account the significance of the dominant firm's market power and its 
consequences for the conduct's effect on competition and the competitive process in the market as it 
actually exists. In other words, it will systematically produce false negatives precisely because it 
fails to take into account the characteristic that most drives jurisdictions to prohibit unilateral 
conduct: market power. 
  
67  Office of Fair Trading, above n 55, at 3 (emphasis supplied). This guidance, issued by the Office of Fair 
Trading in 2004, has been adopted by the Board of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), which 
superseded the OFT in 2014.  
68  At 13–14. 
69  At 18 (emphasis original). 
70  The ICN has developed an extensive collection of reports, presentations and recommended practices 
regarding a variety of specific types of unilateral conduct. See <www.internationalcompetition 
network.org>. 
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1 Exclusionary distribution practices 
Exclusionary distribution practices can take a variety of forms, many of which are associated 
with plausible efficiency justifications. Across many jurisdictions, it is commonly recognised, for 
example, that practices such as exclusive dealing, various kinds of conditional pricing practices and 
tying can be procompetitive.71 Although there are some differences of opinion regarding the 
evidence that will warrant a prediction of actual or probable harm, there is also wide consensus that: 
(1) these kinds of practices can, when undertaken by a firm with market power, impede competition 
by raising rivals' costs and facilitating the exercise of market power; and (2) the mere fact that the 
practice can be efficient does not necessarily provide a reasonable basis for presuming that it is 
efficient in all circumstances.  
As noted above, therefore, the EC Guidance observes that once anticompetitive harm is 
established, the dominant firm has the burden of demonstrating that its use of the practice resulted in 
efficiencies sufficient to eliminate the likely harm. That a firm without market power might 
undertake these distribution strategies will typically be relevant, but not outcome determinative. It 
may suggest the possibility of an efficient (or at least competitively neutral) use of the practice, but 
it does not establish that it will be beneficial in all instances when adopted by a firm with market 
power. That ultimate judgement is typically a question of fact to be determined in each case.72 Most 
importantly, across many jurisdictions, the critical inquiry will focus on the practice's actual or 
probable effects and the legal and economic standards used to evaluate them. 
When these various kinds of distribution practices are implemented through agreements between 
sellers and buyers, they are often evaluated under competition law provisions related to concerted 
action. However, they have also and frequently arisen under single-firm conduct statutes because 
they can be unilaterally imposed without agreement. In such cases, the unilateral conduct 
prohibition will be the tool of choice – perhaps the only tool available – for evaluating their impact 
on competition. Several prominent examples from other jurisdictions illustrate this approach and 
demonstrate how the counterfactual will likely fail to function well as a tool for differentiating anti 
from procompetitive distribution-related practices. 
  
71  The global literature on these practices is extensive and a review of it is beyond the scope of this article. For 
one survey on the law in the United States, see Andrew I Gavil "Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by 
Dominant Firms: Striking A Better Balance" (2004) 72 Antitrust LJ 3. See also Salop, Pozen and Seward, 
above n 57. One of the most hotly debated strategies has been conditional pricing practices, which include 
what have been labelled as "bundled rebates" or "loyalty" or "share" discounts. The United States Federal 
Trade Commission and Department of Justice held a workshop on these practices in June 2014. See 
"Conditional Pricing Practices: Economic Analysis and Legal Policy Implications" (23 June 2014) Federal 
Trade Commission <www.ftc.gov>. 
72  See for example EC Guidance on Abuse of Dominance, above at 4, at [32]–[46] discussing various forms of 
exclusive dealing, and at [47]–[62] discussing tying. 
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The Microsoft antitrust cases in Europe and the United States provide prominent and useful 
examples of how easily New Zealand's counterfactual could produce a false negative.73 Both 
jurisdictions challenged Microsoft's varied efforts to insulate its flagship Windows desktop 
computer operating system from new forms of competition. Whether characterised as exclusive 
dealing or tying, those efforts included Microsoft's "integration" strategy, what it described as 
adding new functionality to Windows. Whereas the United States case focused in part on 
Microsoft's integration of Internet Explorer (IE), an Internet browser, into Windows, the EC's initial 
case focused in part on its decision similarly to embed Windows Media Player in Windows. In both 
jurisdictions, the agencies and courts concluded that the integration strategy had the effect of 
insulating Windows from competition and that Microsoft had failed to support its integration 
strategy with evidence of technical or business justifications that might eliminate or otherwise 
justify those harms.74  
How would these cases have been decided under New Zealand's counterfactual? If the sole 
relevant question was whether a non-dominant firm would have adopted an integration strategy, the 
cases might well have been decided in favour of Microsoft. The operating systems of non-dominant 
firms included Internet browsers and media players that were at least to some degree bundled, if not 
integrated.75 But those other firms did not possess Microsoft's market power. Hence, their use of an 
integration strategy posed no competitive threat – it could not have the same effect on competition 
as did Microsoft's. Moreover, Microsoft was required to go beyond hypothesising efficiencies or 
technical benefits for integration; it was expected to prove them – and it failed to do so. This is an 
evidentiary burden the counterfactual does not impose. As the United States Court of Appeals for 
the DC Circuit concluded:76 
  
73  This assumes that one agrees with the outcomes in these two cases. 
74  See United States v Microsoft Corp, above n 15; Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v Commission [2007] ECR 
II-3601. For a comprehensive account and analysis of the Microsoft antitrust cases, see Gavil and First, 
above n 29. 
75  In the portion of its decision rejecting application of the United States "per se" rule against tying, the DC 
Circuit noted that integration was "common among firms without market power" and that "[t]he ubiquity of 
bundling in competitive platform software markets should give courts reason to pause before condemning 
such behaviour in less competitive markets": United States v Microsoft Corp, above n 15, at 93. 
Nevertheless, in its analysis, at 64–67, of the Government's monopoly maintenance claim, this observation 
did not alter the Court's conclusion that Microsoft had failed to support any efficiency or technical 
justification for its integration strategy. See also Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, above n 
14, at 603 (defendant's continued cooperation with rivals in other geographic markets was deemed probative 
of its anticompetitive intent and of the effect of its conduct in the geographic market in which it refused to 
continue dealing with a rival after a long history of cooperation). 
76  United States v Microsoft Corp, above n 15, at 66–67. The Court of First Instance (now the General Court) 
similarly concluded that Microsoft had failed to support its arguments that its integration strategy was 
somehow justified. See Microsoft Corp v Commission, above n 74, at [1091]–[1167]. 
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Microsoft proffers no justification for two of the three challenged actions that it took in integrating IE 
into Windows – excluding IE from the Add/Remove Programs utility and commingling browser and 
operating system code. Although Microsoft does make some general claims regarding the benefits of 
integrating the browser and the operating system … it neither specifies nor substantiates those claims. 
Nor does it argue that either excluding IE from the Add/Remove Programs utility or commingling code 
achieves any integrative benefit. Plaintiffs plainly made out a prima facie case of harm to competition in 
the operating system market by demonstrating that Microsoft's actions increased its browser usage share 
and thus protected its operating system monopoly from a middleware threat and, for its part, Microsoft 
failed to meet its burden of showing that its conduct serves a purpose other than protecting its operating 
system monopoly. Accordingly, we hold that Microsoft's exclusion of IE from the Add/Remove 
Programs utility and its commingling of browser and operating system code constitute exclusionary 
conduct, in violation of § 2. 
Precisely because the counterfactual fails to account for market power, and infers justifications 
based on the conduct of other, non-dominant firms, it will systematically err in cases such as 
Microsoft, where adverse competitive effects flow from the dominant firm's market power and 
conduct-specific efficiency evidence is lacking.77 
2 Refusals to deal and predatory pricing 
"Refusal to deal" with rival firms has been one of the most debated practices in competition 
policy.78 Sometimes involving vertically integrated monopolists and heavily regulated industries, 
refusals to deal present something of a paradox: in general, competition laws encourage rivalry, and 
specifically prohibit certain forms of firm-to-firm cooperation – "concerted action" that substantially 
reduces competition. A refusal to deal, therefore, would seem to be consistent with the promotion of 
rivalry, not an abuse of dominance. Many jurisdictions also hesitate to condemn refusals to deal 
owing to concerns about the wisdom and administrability of possible remedies. Imposing a duty to 
deal with a rival as a remedy for a refusal to deal would seem to be inconsistent with the 
overarching goal of promoting rivalry, and may require enforcers and courts to specify the terms of 
  
77  For another recent example from the United States, see McWane Inc v Federal Trade Commission, above n 
15, affirming the Federal Trade Commission's finding that a dominant firm engaged in anticompetitive 
exclusive dealing lacked any efficiency justification. See also ZF Meritor LLC v Eaton Corp 696 F 3d 254 
(3d Cir 2012) where de facto exclusive dealing agreements were found to unreasonably foreclose 
competition; and United States v Dentsply International Inc, above n 1, reversing dismissal of the 
Government's challenge to the unilateral imposition of exclusive dealing by a dominant firm. The law of 
exclusion in the United States is demanding of plaintiffs, yet it is unlikely that any of these cases, each of 
which found liability, would have been decided the same way under s 36 as it is now being interpreted.  
78  More broadly framed, the issue can be understood in remedial terms: when should competition law impose a 
duty to deal with a rival as a remedy for a competition law violation? Although the typical scenario involves 
a dominant firm's refusal to supply a rival and a request for mandated dealing, imposing a duty to deal could 
also be an appropriate remedy in cases involving other kinds of exclusionary conduct. And there may be 
alternative remedies to cases involving an unlawful refusal to deal, such as divestiture. 
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dealing for some period of time. Nevertheless, most jurisdictions, albeit to differing degrees, have 
embraced the principle that a refusal to deal can under some circumstances be anticompetitive and 
hence constitute a form of monopolisation or abuse of dominance.79 
Predatory pricing shares some common characteristics with refusal to deal. First, at least in its 
initial stage, the conduct would seem to be desirable: aggressive reductions in price will presumably 
benefit consumers. Secondly, it would seem anomalous for competition law enforcement agencies 
and courts to order firms to raise prices, but that is the almost inevitable result of a finding that 
prices have been set "too low". Finally, like a requirement that rivals deal with each other, ordering 
a firm to raise its prices might require continuing judicial or administrative oversight and difficult 
judgements about what the "competitive" price level ought to be at any given moment. Despite these 
concerns, and as with refusals to deal, most jurisdictions have endorsed the idea that in some cases 
prices should be condemned when "predatory".80  
In large part because of these somewhat distinctive and common characteristics, specific 
approaches and tests have been developed to evaluate refusals to deal and predatory pricing. Those 
approaches and tests all share a common goal, however: to identify refusals to deal and pricing 
practices that are likely to have anticompetitive effects. As with all single-firm conduct, but perhaps 
more so with these types of conduct, that is highly unlikely absent market power or a substantial 
threat that it can be acquired. Asking as the counterfactual does, therefore, whether a non-dominant 
firm would engage in the same conduct will be perhaps uniquely unrevealing of effects with respect 
to such conduct. It will also be uniquely difficult to construct the necessary hypotheticals.  
New Zealand's leading decision on predatory pricing under s 36 is Carter Holt Harvey81 – and it 
is arguably subject to alternative interpretations. The Commerce Commission alleged that Carter 
Holt Harvey possessed substantial market power and that it responded to new entry by developing a 
competing product and then selling it below cost. In reviewing the decisions of the lower courts, the 
Privy Council appeared unequivocally to endorse reliance on the counterfactual for alleged 
  
79  See for example Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, above n 14. Aspen Skiing Co must be 
read, however, in light of Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, above n 29, at 409, 
which maintained that the decision is "at or near the outer boundary of s 2 [Sherman Act] liability". The 
European courts have taken a more aggressive stance with respect to refusals to deal. See for example 
Microsoft Corp v Commission, above n 74. 
80  Most jurisdictions use an initial screen that compares price to cost and condemn only "below cost" pricing, 
although different measures of cost can be employed. There is a difference of viewpoint, however, as to 
whether proof of probable recoupment also should be required in addition to proof of below cost pricing. 
See generally International Competition Network Unilateral Practices Working Group Predatory Pricing 
Analysis Pursuant to Unilateral Conduct Laws: Recommended Practices (2014). 
81  Carter Holt Harvey Building Products Group Ltd v Commerce Commission [2006] 1 NZLR 145 (PC). The 
decision cites to and relies upon Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission [2003] HCA 5, (2003) 215 CLR 374. 
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violations of s 36, including predatory pricing.82 It immediately observed, however, that application 
of the counterfactual "requires particular care where, as in the present case, the impugned conduct 
consists of price cutting".83 To define that "particular care", it turned to Boral Besser and a well-
known decision from the United States,84 both of which had embraced the two-part test for 
predatory pricing followed in Australia, the United States and some other jurisdictions. As the Privy 
Council reasoned, "The margin between legitimate competition and anticompetitive conduct is not 
crossed by the lowering of prices. It is crossed when the dominant firm uses its ability to raise prices 
without losing its market share."85 It later added: "A dominant firm uses its position of dominance 
when it engages in price cutting with a view to recouping its losses without loss of market share by 
raising prices without fear of reprisals afterwards."86 A violation of s 36 for price cutting, therefore, 
would require proof of both pricing below some measure of cost and evidence of a probable later 
ability to recoup any losses incurred. These are indicia of probable anticompetitive effect. 
Is this an application of the counterfactual or a rejection of it? To determine whether the prices 
charged by a dominant firm are below some measure of cost, the Commerce Commission and the 
courts will by necessity focus on the price and cost evidence gathered from that firm, not a 
hypothetical firm in a non-dominant position. Similarly, the inquiry into recoupment will focus on 
the dominant firm, its market power and the characteristics of the industry, not the hypothetical, 
non-dominant firm, which presumably and almost by definition would not be in a position either to 
price below cost or to recoup. The questions presented in a predatory pricing case, therefore, are not 
  
82  Carter Holt Harvey Building Products Group Ltd v Commerce Commission, above n 81, at 164: "It follows 
that if a dominant firm is acting as a non-dominant firm otherwise in the same position would have acted in 
a market which was competitive it cannot be said to be using its dominance to achieve the purpose that is 
prohibited." It later reiterates, at 166, its commitment to the counterfactual in summarising the collective 
requirements of the previous cases: "It is … both legitimate and necessary when giving effect to s 36 to 
apply the counterfactual test to determine whether the defendant has used its position of dominance."  
83  At 164. 
84  Barry Wright Corp v ITT Grinnell Corp 724 F 2d 227 (1st Cir 1983) (the opinion was authored by Associate 
Justice Stephen Breyer of the United States Supreme Court when he was a Judge of the Court of Appeals). 
The two-step approach has been endorsed by the United States Supreme Court, as well. See Brooke Group 
Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp 509 US 209 (1993) (pricing must be below some measure of cost 
and the defendant must have a probability of recouping the losses incurred during the period of below cost 
pricing); and Weyerhaeuser Co v Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co 549 US 312 (2007) (applying same 
standards to a monopsonist engaged in allegedly predatory bidding). 
85  Carter Holt Harvey Building Products Group Ltd v Commerce Commission, above n 81, at 164 (emphasis 
in original). 
86  At 166. 
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directed at the hypothetical firm in a competitive market, and cannot be answered with any precision 
by referring to it.87  
This approach, with its more direct focus on the firm with substantial market power, its costs 
and its market position, is an arguable departure from the counterfactual as it has been described and 
applied in other cases. Carter Holt Harvey can be understood, therefore, not as a case that applied 
the counterfactual, but as one that implicitly recognised its limits as a guide to the application of s 
36. Although one could argue that the Privy Council's approach supported the conclusion that a non-
dominant firm would not have priced below cost, and hence was an effective use of the 
counterfactual, that was not the question presented and would be something of a reverse application 
of the test. At most, it is possible to view the Privy Council's approach as a specialised application 
of the counterfactual, but it surely seems to have been prompted by an awareness that rigid 
application of the counterfactual would lead to unacceptable results. The remaining question is 
whether the "particular care" that justified departure in a predatory pricing case is warranted in other 
cases under s 36, as well. 
Similarly, although the incentives of large and small firms in responding to a request to deal 
might be very different, in some cases they might be the same: both would refuse to share their 
products, services or know-how with a rival. But that refusal is wholly unlikely to have any 
competitive significance if undertaken by a firm lacking market power. The counterfactual, 
therefore, might systematically lead to false negatives, precisely because it does not look at the 
different effects that can flow from a refusal to deal by a firm with and without market power.  It 
might yield the correct outcome in some cases, but not necessarily for the right reasons. 
Again, the European Microsoft case is informative.88 One of the central allegations in the EC's 
case against Microsoft was that it had refused to share sufficient information about its desktop 
  
87  For the Commerce Commission's explanation of the case, which confirms this approach, see Commerce 
Commission Case study: Predatory pricing or competitive price matching? (June 2012). Even if it had 
intended to apply the counterfactual, the Privy Council could not have done so in any sensible way. It would 
first have asked whether a non-dominant firm would have priced below cost under the same circumstances. 
But would the calculation be based on the hypothetical competitive firm's costs or those of the dominant 
firm, which might benefit from economies of scale? The "other circumstances" are difficult to hold constant. 
Even if that question could be resolved, the results of the inquiry would necessarily be ambiguous. The 
answer might be "no", the non-dominant firm would not price below cost, but that might be either because it 
lacks the means to finance a below cost strategy or because it lacks the incentive to do so because it could 
not recoup any losses suffered. In either event, could it then safely be inferred that the dominant firm must 
have been taking advantage of its substantial market power? That a non-dominant firm cannot recoup losses 
does not necessarily support the inference that a dominant firm can. Such an approach would likely result in 
a false positives and over-deter aggressive pricing. It would be prudent, therefore, as the Privy Council held, 
to undertake an independent evaluation of the dominant firm's ability to recoup. The questions themselves 
do not seem to be informative and hence were not posed. 
88  Microsoft Corp v Commission, above n 74. 
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operating system, Windows, to allow for smooth interoperation between computers running 
Windows and Sun Microsystems' server operating systems. Microsoft argued that the necessary 
information was proprietary and that sharing it would undermine innovation incentives for both 
itself and Sun. Both the Commission and the Court of First Instance rejected Microsoft 's arguments, 
concluding that its refusal to share the necessary interoperability information had an anticompetitive 
effect and could not be justified.89 
How would the analysis have proceeded in New Zealand under the counterfactual? If a non-
dominant firm would similarly have refused to deal, perhaps in order to protect its know-how, the 
counterfactual would have inferred that, in doing so, Microsoft was not acting with the purpose of 
taking advantage of its market power. Exonerating Microsoft, however, would entirely ignore the 
reality that a refusal to deal by a firm lacking market power is unlikely ever to have any appreciable 
impact on competition – not true for a firm with substantial and durable market power. It thus 
sidesteps the more salient questions of whether Microsoft's refusal to deal had any significant 
impact on competition and whether it had any justification for its conduct. Even critics of the EC's 
and Court of First Instance's conclusion that Microsoft's refusal to deal with Sun constituted an 
infringement of art 102 would likely agree that these are the right questions to be addressed. 
Conversely, what if the non-dominant firm would have happily shared its interoperability 
information in order to expand use of its operating system and maximise its profits? Would it then 
have been warranted to infer that Microsoft's refusal to deal necessarily involved "taking advantage 
of" its market power? Such a conclusion might be warranted, and in this instance the counterfactual 
could reach a correct conclusion. It might rightly infer that the dominant firm was refusing to deal in 
order to impede its rivals and perpetuate its monopoly. On the other hand, the dominant firm might 
have had competitively neutral justifications and considerations for doing that which was simply 
unavailable to the non-dominant firm – justifications that would go unconsidered under the 
counterfactual. 
To be sure, in most jurisdictions cases challenging refusals to deal must be carefully considered 
and will likely be rare. The counterfactual approach to assessing refusals to deal might provide an 
accurate prediction in some cases, but almost by accident and randomly. For a non-dominant firm, 
agreeing to deal with rival firms, especially larger ones, could be entirely sensible. It could open it 
up to a much larger market and allow it to reach economies of scale otherwise unreachable. But for 
the dominant firm that has already reached scale, the risks to sharing might make refusing to deal a 
  
89  For a discussion of this aspect of the case, see Gavil and First, above n 29, at 203–210 and 218–222. See 
also EC Guidance on Abuse of Dominance, above at 4, at [75]–[90]. For an analysis of refusals to deal by an 
unregulated, vertically integrated monopolist, see Steven C Salop "Refusals to Deal and Price Squeezes by 
an Unregulated, Vertically Integrated Monopolist" (2010) 76 Antitrust LJ 709. For another that focuses on 
intellectual property, see Howard A Shelanski "Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Intellectual and Other 
Property" (2009) 76 Antitrust LJ 369. 
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rational strategy.90 What is clear is that the effects of a dominant firm's refusal to deal are likely to 
be so different when compared to a refusal by a non-dominant firm as to make reliance on the 
counterfactual unlikely to yield any reliable inferences.  
V CONCLUSION 
The principal justification for retaining the counterfactual test is to constrain the scope of s 36. It 
is a permissive test that will provide firms with substantial market power a wide berth to pursue 
aggressive competitive strategies, leaving little room for successful challenges to their conduct.  As I 
have argued, however, there should be no pretence that it will achieve this goal because it accurately 
differentiates competitive from exclusionary conduct. To the contrary, it will do so by default, often 
misdiagnosing the competitive desirability of conduct because it fails to consider its market effects. 
If it is certain and predictable, it is because it imposes burdens that will rarely be met. Several paths 
to reform might therefore be pursued. 
First, despite the New Zealand Supreme Court's seeming commitment to the counterfactual in 
0867, the Commission might consider initiating another, more stark test case; one that would likely 
"pass" the counterfactual test, but present the courts with an uncomfortably obvious instance of 
anticompetitive effects. Instances of such "naked exclusion" will likely be rare, but such a case 
might provoke greater receptivity to alternative interpretations of the current language. The question 
is, if confronted with an obviously anomalous result, would the courts bend? The treatment of 
predatory pricing offers some hope for flexibility. 
The alternative, as is well known, is amendment. Some minor improvements could be 
attempted, such as the addition of an effects test, such as that in s 27, which would explicitly require 
consideration of pro and anticompetitive effects. A likely argument against such an approach would 
be its greater complexity, cost and uncertainty. But as I have argued, the counterfactual does not 
necessarily alleviate those concerns. A revised statute might address them by building in guided 
presumptions that would more easily shift burdens, so that easier cases might be more quickly 
decided. The intermediate approach of specifying presumptions might also serve to deter more 
obviously anticompetitive conduct, while creating safe harbours for conduct more likely to be 
procompetitive. 
  
90  The High Court of Australia seemed to take a more effects-focused approach to its analysis of a refusal to 
supply in Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v The Broken Hill Pty Ltd, above n 13. Although there are 
reflections of a counterfactual analysis, it is one that was informed by evidence that specifically related to 
the defendant. The Court observed, for example, at [28], that if the defendant "were operating in a 
competitive market – it is highly unlikely that it would stand by, without any effort to compete, and allow 
the appellant to secure its supply … from a competitor". It further observed, at [29], that the defendant sold 
the same product in markets where it faced competition, and that it "did not offer a legitimate reason for the 
effective refusal to sell". These observations are not based on inferences drawn from a hypothetical 
competitive market, but from evidence relating to the defendant and its actual conduct in the market 
examined. 
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Finally, there is the possibility of major reform. With Australia now appearing to take the lead, 
conditions might be ripe for substantial reconsideration of s 36. The rationale for the counterfactual, 
as I have argued, is highly questionable. It will be prone to error in many common circumstances, is 
inconsistent with other provisions of the Commerce Act, and is clearly out of step with developing 
global norms. It is likely providing encouragement to dominant firms to respond aggressively to 
competitive challenges, and not necessarily on the merits, to the detriment of New Zealand's 
consumers and perhaps to its global competitiveness. It may also be stifling development of a more 
sophisticated body of economically informed law concerning exclusionary conduct by firms with 
market power. Consideration of a "counterfactual" approach to rebalance New Zealand's approach 
to single-firm conduct would appear to be in order. 
